Challenging the Empire
At the start of World War I, Great Britain was the richest nation due to its many territorial holdings, defended by the world’s largest navy. To maintain its position and interests, Britain always wanted to ensure that the balance of power in Europe did not swing in favor of any one nation. For instance, throughout the 19th century, Britain maintained its dominance by keeping other nations in check. In the first half of the century, the enemy was France (the Napoleonic Wars). By the middle of the century, the enemy had become Russia (the Crimean War).
After the North German Confederation, led by the Kingdom of Prussia, defeated France in the War of 1870, German unification hastened, leading to the founding of the German Empire. Britain now viewed the Germans as the new threat to the balance of power on the continent. With Kaiser Wilhelm’s project of building up the High Seas Fleet (I discuss this in another blog here) to challenge Britain, an arms race began between the two nations after the turn of the century in the lead-up to the disaster of 1914.
But declaring war against Germany in 1914 was actually a more roundabout affair than one might imagine.
Trouble in Ireland
In 1800, two acts were passed under the title An Act for the Union of Great Britain and Ireland. The acts unified the Kingdom of Great Britain and the Kingdom of Ireland. Throughout the 1800s, Irish opposition to this unification grew in intensity in the latter half of the 19th century, reaching a boiling point by the outbreak of war in 1914.
I reference this book quite a bit, but G.J. Meyer’s A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918 has a chapter called “London in 1914” that does an excellent job detailing the political machinations happening in Britain as the continental nations of Europe were mobilizing for war.
I’ll do my best to summarize the key points:
The Liberal Party had been in power for eight years before 1914, but its power was waning, and
it had become dependent on thirty Irish nationalists to maintain it.
To remain in power meant Home Rule, giving Ireland its own parliament and government.
The Ulsterman of Northern Ireland, who were Protestant (the rest of Ireland was Catholic), meant that Home Rule would subjugate them underneath the pope in Rome. They obviously did not like this idea.
Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith would be forced to deliver on a Home Rule bill or face replacement.
As a Home Rule bill moved through Parliament, it was heavily opposed by Conservatives, who the Unionists supported. Against the backdrop of this, Unionists organized one hundred thousand Ulsterman into militias, smuggling weapons into the north of Ireland in the event the bill passed. They would take up arms rather than accept Home Rule.
Another challenge was the British army’s leadership, which was comprised of Unionists who opposed Asquith’s government.
After the Curragh Mutiny and the resignation of Field Marshal Sir John French, who was the chief of the imperial general staff (along with the resignations of other officers), the king had to intervene. He would ultimately fail in his intervention, making civil war seem imminent.
Heading To War
At the same time, war was brewing in Europe. As discussed before, Britain had always tried to maintain the balance of power. As war on the continent approached, a majority in parliament remained anti-war. That changed after a series of exchanges between the German and British governments. The Kaiser (desperate to keep Britain out of the war) said that Germany would pledge itself to restore the borders of France and Belgium if war came and Germany won. The question of Belgium, which had not been considered or mentioned before, suddenly became the core topic of discussion about going to war or not. But first, some background.
To maintain the Concert of Europe (the relative peace in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars in which the major powers agreed to maintain a balance of power, political boundaries, and spheres of influence), the Treaty of London (1839) was signed. After the Belgian Revolution of 1830 and the previous failure of the Treaty of the Eighteen Articles, the Treaty of London was finally signed, guaranteeing Belgium’s independence from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and its neutrality. Britain signed this treaty, which would prove fateful seventy-five years later.
The question of British intervention shifted. No longer were they trying to come to grips with a justification for war simply in support of France and Russia. It became a question of whether or not Britain should cede its interests by letting the small but strategically vital neutral nation be invaded. Especially after they pledged to uphold its neutrality. Therefore, the nation’s honor and overarching interests were clearly at stake. So much so that government officials knew the public would understand the gravity of the Belgian question and would most likely support going to war.
That decision came on Tuesday, 4 August 1914, when Germany moved its troops into Belgium, heading toward Liège. King Albert of Belgium made it clear they would fight. Before midnight, Britain and Germany were at war.
Defeat on the European Continent
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was a professional, all-volunteer force at the outbreak of the war, whereas the rest of Europe’s armies were raised by conscription. The British regular army had just under 250,000 men, yet half of them were stationed across the Empire. Britain could raise another 200,000 reservists. There were another 270,000 in the Territorial Army, but they were meant for home defense. This paled in comparison to the 3.8 million men Germany could muster.
Britain deployed its army quickly to France—faster than the Germans had expected. In Part 1 and Part 2 of my previous blog series, What-if Scenarios: Success of the Schlieffen Plan, I explored this in greater detail. Essentially, the right flank of the German advance, aimed at swinging toward Paris, unexpectedly ran into the British.
Despite its significant lack in numbers, the BEF could punch above its weight, given its experience. Yet, that might not have mattered. If certain decisions had been made differently on the German side, the opening days could have ended very poorly for the British. But they didn’t, and as they say, the rest is history.
However, as we have explored with other nations in previous blogs, what would a defeat in early 1914 mean for Britain?
In this scenario, I’ve assumed Britain would find some way not to continue the war. You could argue that Britain, facing embarrassment on the world stage, would’ve fought on with its navy to reach more favorable terms or until they could rebuild their army. Let’s explore this first.
If they had stayed in the war, the British would‘ve had to rebuild their army. In our timeline, they mustered the New Army, also called Kitchner’s Army, but the first divisions would not see action until August 1915. With France out of the war, Britain would’ve had to rejoin the fight in Italy (if Italy even joined the fight given they didn’t until May 1915) and/or Russia (assuming they were still in the fight by then).
Russia was reeling from defeats in the east. Though it has a massive population to restore those numbers to continue the war, it’s hard to say if they would with France out of the fight. Italy (again, assuming they somehow enter the fray) might also seek a settlement given that it would now be facing not only Austria-Hungary but potentially a portion of the German forces that were fighting in France. It’s possible the British would find themselves without any allies to get back into the fight somewhere on the continent.
Now, circling back to our original thesis in which Britain is forced into some sort of settlement out of the war in late 1914 or early 1915, how would that come about? Let’s explore what the destruction of the BEF would potentially mean:
The Liberal Party would’ve been hard-pressed to maintain power. Even though they were against the war, the Conservatives would use this as an opportunity to undermine their power.
As we saw in 1916, an Irish armed revolt might’ve happened earlier, seeing that London was distracted. If civil war had broken out, that could’ve further helped the Conservatives rise to power. If they had, a civil war in Ireland would’ve been put down with a heavy hand, shifting Britain’s focus inward rather than outward.
In their eyes, having won the war, the Germans might’ve offered what the Kaiser previously recommended and restored Belgium to reach a deal with the British (it's hard to say if they would’ve promised to restore the French borders as well).
Therefore, Britain might've lived to fight another day if a treaty did not compromise their interests, especially if it reconciled their reason for entering the war—restoring Belgium. And if it was dealing with a civil war in its backyard, seeking a peace agreement might have been prudent (assuming prudence wins the day, but again, that might not have been the case given the historical events of the previous century).
In this timeline, we’ve also been exploring the hotspot for a future war, which I have suggested would’ve remained in the Balkans and the Baghdad to Berlin railway. I think seeing a threat to the Suez Canal come 1919 or sometime in the 20s due to this railway (assuming it’s completed) would result in a violent reaction by Britain and France. Both had economic ties to the canal and, after losing in 1914, might see this as an opportunity to exact some revenge and stop the German juggernaut once and for all.
In my next blog, we’ll turn to France and see what might’ve happened to the nation if the Schlieffen Plan had brought about its defeat in 1914.
Read Next Blog <Coming Soon>
Sources:
Meyer, G.J. A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918. New York, Bantam Books, 2015.
Images:
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