Threat to the Third Republic
After the collapse of the Second French Empire in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, France was left embarrassed by its defeat. Falling to the North German Confederation, their defeat created nationalism that unified the German states into the German Empire. As a result, Germany became the dominant military power on the continent.
But the embarrassment didn’t stop there. France was forced to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs, meant to cripple the country (which it didn’t). They also lost the iron and coal-rich territories of Alsace-Lorraine. This loss would undoubtedly have ripple effects in France that would feed into the disaster they would become a part of in 1914.
In this blog, I’ll explore some of the events involving France and Germany leading up to World War I, a peculiar episode in French politics, the French Army’s war plans, and what would’ve happened if the country faced another defeat at the hands of Germany.
The Growing Divide
Relations between Germany and France continued to deteriorate after 1871. Embittered by their loss to Germany, multiple crises would arise that would bring what would be known as the Triple Entente (France, Britain, and Russia) closer together and further isolate Germany.
Granted, French and British relations were not that great either. However, after the Entente Cordiale of 1904, relations improved between the two nations. Combined with the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, the pieces for the eventual Triple Entente were in place.
One of the defining moments that changed the perception of France’s weakness on the international stage since 1871 was the Second Moroccan Crisis. Strategically located where the Mediterranean meets the Atlantic, Germany wanted to challenge France’s growing influence over the country. This led to two crises, one in 1905 and the second in 1911.
French Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux, an important figure for France in the lead-up to the war, oversaw the second crisis. Having successfully won the colony at the lowest price that Germany was willing to accept, the event did several things:
Rather than divide Britain and France (which was one of Germany’s objectives), it brought them closer together (along with Russia), further isolating Germany.
It reinvigorated French nationalism and contributed to Raymond Poincaré's rise to prime minister in 1912 and the presidency in 1913. This crisis taught him specifically that firmness was the only way to deal with the Germans (which would prove critical later).
It also further invigorated the arms race and the idea that war was an eventuality.
But much of what we talk about next revolves around Caillaux.
A Distracted City
As Europe was barreling toward war, the people of France and its capital city were not paying attention. Like something that you would see today, a story that involved sex, scandal, and murder captured the focus of the public. And it all centered around Joseph Caillaux.
Caillaux was a rising political figure in French politics. In partnership with Socialist leader Jean Jaurès, Caillaux was somewhat guilty by association. The conservatives led by Poincaré wanted to extend military service from two to three years, building on the surge in nationalism in the wake of the Second Moroccan Crisis. The conservatives saw it as critical to improving France’s military readiness in the event of war, which seemed all the more likely.
The Socialists, specifically Jaurès, thought this was just another move that exacerbated an arms buildup that he thought was madness. He also believed it was ridiculous that France, the only republic on the continent at the time, was hitching its wagon to tsarist Russia (a nation he viewed as a relic of the past in its form of government), that general war would lead to disaster for all parties involved (which it would), and that it was not impossible for Germany and France to find common ground to avoid war.
Caillaux was shrouded in this light despite not saying he would not support the increase in the number of years of service for the army. In fact, he never questioned whether France should be militarily strong. Moreover, General Joseph Joffre was made head of the French General staff during his premiership, which would strengthen the military. He also wanted to invest in artillery and new innovations like aircraft.
But that didn’t matter. Anyone who has paid attention to politics recently, especially in the United States, should know that it's a dirty game of mudslinging to see what sticks. And these ideas stuck to Caillaux. Despite this, it would seem that Caillaux was slated for victory in 1914. Then, scandal struck.
One of Caillaux’s faults was his womanizing. He had controversially gotten involved with a married woman (when he was also married himself). They both would divorce their partners and marry. Caillaux’s first wife, desiring vengeance, gave letters that Caillaux had sent to her in 1901 when she was his mistress (while married to another man at the time…there seems to be a common pattern here), to the editor of the conservative publication Le Figaro, Gaston Calmette. These were published and led to a scandal that would compel Caillaux’s second wife, angered and embarrassed by the ridicule she received from the story, to buy a Browning automatic pistol. She would shoot Calmette four times, killing him.
While the election was a disaster for the conservatives, Caillaux’s political career was over because of this scandal, and a replacement would have to be found. Poincaré agreed begrudgingly to the appointment of René Viviani, an inexperienced politician who would prove consequential to how France navigated the July Crisis. It was only after the case of Caillaux’s second wife ended (she was found not guilty by a chivalrous jury) that French newspapers and the public would wake up to the fact that they were about to go to war.
Plan XVII and its Failure
The appointment of Viviani would lead to blunders that the savvier Calliaux probably could have avoided better. But we pick this story up with another character related to the Caillaux episode: General Joseph Joffre.
Joffre and the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre (the peacetime name for the French Army's general headquarters) developed Plan XVII. Developed between 1912 and 1914, Plan XVII outlined how the French army would mobilize and concentrate its forces at the outbreak of war. This would act as the staging mechanism for Joffre’s invasion of the Alsace-Lorraine region. It was constructed assuming the Germans would concentrate most of their forces on the French and German border.
While the plan did consider an attack through Belgium or Luxembourg possible, such a German move was deemed unlikely. This dismissal by Joffre would prove fatal later when General Charles Lanrezac, in charge of the French Fifth Army, requested to move to a better position north. After receiving reports of the intensified German assault on Liege, he concluded that the only possible reason for such an attack was that the Germans intended to swing around their left flank (which the Germans would do). Joffre did not believe this was the main German thrust and delayed Lanrezac’s response after many requests to move further north. When Joffre finally did let Lanrezac go, it was too late.
Furthermore, Joffre’s attacks into the Alsace-Lorraine region, which he saw as a ripe prize given how it had dominated the country’s mind since 1871, would end in disaster in the Battle of the Frontiers. And his assumptions about where and how Germany would strike were perhaps, if not a lack of imagination (for he had considered it), a lack of belief that the Germans would dare violate the neutrality of those nations to bypass the frontier defenses. It was a blunder that nearly led to disaster.
Mired in Defeat
As I covered in my two-part series detailing the critical moments where the Germans might have found a way to shatter the Allied left, let’s assume that Germany does break the British Expeditionary Force and finds a way to roll up the French line. It would’ve probably been the military disaster of the century, resulting in another French defeat to the Germans in less than fifty years.
The repercussions of such a defeat would inevitably be felt in French politics in the future. It could further add fuel to the fire of Revanchism (maybe France would turn fascist rather than Germany in this timeline). I think, taking into account what we discussed in Part 1 with the British, the end result probably would’ve been:
The French would have to officially recognize Alsace-Lorraine as German territory.
They would have to cede some of their colonial holdings, particularly in Africa (maybe the Germans get what they want in Morocco, after all).
Another costly indemnity payment.
The Kaiser promised to restore Belgium’s borders and the French to prevent the British from entering the war. But after achieving victory, it's hard to say if the Germans would agree to restore French borders (they most likely would Belgium just to bring peace between them and Britain). They may want to really ensure the French could not challenge them in a future war and force them to dismantle or turn over the territory of the frontier defenses. Moreover, the German invasion would’ve captured France's northeastern part, which comprised 14 percent of its industrial output.
This area produced:
75 percent of France’s coal production.
81 percent of its iron.
63 percent of its steel.
85 percent of its linen.
94 percent of its wool.
75 percent of its sugar.
Such a loss, if kept by the Germans, would be absolutely devastating to France’s ability to recover from such a defeat and challenge Germany in the future. But Britain and Russia would understand this, too. While the prudent thing for the Germans would be to neuter France once and for all, the Kaiser, who at this time still held power in the government, might stick to his promise to end the war by restoring the borders. Regardless, as I’ve suggested throughout these blogs, such a victory in 1914, I think, would only set up the next war; no matter when the next war came, it would’ve had the potential to end just as bloody as either of the World Wars.
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Sources:
Meyer, G.J. A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918. New York, Bantam Books, 2015.
Images:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jos._Caillaux_LOC_24691408375.jpg https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mevrouw_Gueydan,_de_eerste_vrouw_van_Joseph_Caillaux_(1863-1944),_-Frans_politicus_en_staatsman,_o,_SFA005001012.jpg
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