Disaster Before the Marne
On 1 August 1914, Germany declared war on Russia, entering World War I. But, rather than mobilizing against Russia, Germany focused its efforts on the West. On 3 August 1914, it declared war on France, unleashing an attack through Belgium to attack and capture Paris from the north. This was part of the famed Schlieffen Plan, first drawn up in 1905 by the then chief of the general staff, Field Marshall Count Alfred von Schlieffen.
At the outbreak of World War I, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (the nephew of Moltke the Elder, the previous chief of the general staff) held what once was Schlieffen’s position. Moltke had adjusted the plan leading up to the war, potentially compromising its original intent (a lightning-fast victory against France, which seems ironic now, given how the war went). Once the battle commenced, decisions during the engagements toward Paris also impacted the plan’s overall success.
In this two-part blog series, I’ll first explore the original Schlieffen Plan and its changes, then point to key moments where the Germans could’ve capitalized on situations that might have changed the war's outcome in the opening days.
What was the Original Schlieffen Plan?
The Schliefflen Plan arose out of fear of a two-front war. With the formation of the French-Russian Entente just before the turn of the century, it appeared that Germany would most likely have to face both countries if war came. Schliefflen based the plan on several assumptions:
Even with Austro-Hungary on its side, Germany could not win a protracted war against France and Russia.
Russia would be unable to quickly mobilize.
Russia’s size would inevitably elude any invaders’ desire for a quick victory in the east, as Napolean had suffered after capturing Moscow in 1812 (just as Hitler and his armies would fall short in capturing the Russian capital over one hundred years later).
With these conclusions in mind, Schliefflen believed that Germany needed to crush France first before turning to face Russia. His plan called for the following:
Invasion of 3 neutral territories (Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg) to bypass the formidable French defenses in the rugged hill country on the border. The attack would swing west counterclockwise before turning south toward Paris. It would then turn East and destroy the remaining French army.
Deployment of 90 divisions (in 1905, the German army only had 60), with the right-wing acting as the “fist” of the attack. Schiefflen designed the attack to have the right wing seven times larger than the left wing.
Capture Paris within 40 days.
However, Moltke made several changes to the plan that historians have been arguing over for decades. These changes were not without reason.
Adjusting the Schliefflen Plan to New Realities
The first change that Moltke made was to avoid invading Holland. He argued that the German army would not have the time to subdue the Dutch army, nor could they bypass it. He also believed they needed a neutral country as a “windpipe” to access supplies (which raises questions about whether he truely believed the operation would work given victory was supposed to be achieved in six weeks—why would you need a “windpipe?”).
This decision would force the overloaded right wing of the attack into a narrow approach between the Ardennes and south of Holland. This would lead them straight into the formidable fortress network the Belgians built at Leige. Without invading Holland, they could not bypass them. That decision would have repercussions on the timetable, delaying the German advance by four to five days.
Next, since the French army was much more of a force to be feared than in Schliefflen's days, Moltke became convinced he could not afford to have so many forces dedicated to the right wing. He would change the plan to have only three times more than the left wing. Regarding divisions, Schliefflen had assigned 59 divisions to the right wing and only 9 to the left wing. Moltke changed this and assigned 55 divisions to the right wing and 23 to the left wing in a defensive posture to stave off a French.
Moltke and his staff correctly predicted where the main French force would be located for a potential counterattack. They were worried the right wing would be cut off in the event of a French response, leading to a lightning-fast victory for France rather than Germany. Despite these adjustments, the opening part of the war appeared to go according to plan, albeit with some surprises.
Underestimating the Entente’s Response
Moltke had only left East Prussia lightly defended with 1 of the 8 field armies he formed from the 87 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions Germany mustered. This 1 army would face formidable attacks from multiple Russian armies that mobilized faster than expected. After dire reports from Prussia, the homeland of the Junkers, Moltke was forced to act and diluted his forces attacking France, sending three infantry corps and a calvary division to East Prussia. Combined with his earlier adjustments, reinforcement of his unthreatened left wing, and two corps to besiege Antwerp and another to besiege the French stronghold at Maubeuge, he had reduced his right wing by one-third. When factoring in battlefield losses, that’s significant.
The second surprise was the rapid deployment of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France. A smaller force when compared to its peers, it was a well-trained, veteran force used to fighting in far-flung corners abroad when the navy was not enough. They were high-spirited and excellent marksman, helping them punch above their weight despite their smaller numbers. By 20 August, the BEF was in France and was moving North from Le Havre to link up with the French and extend their left wing. They would smack directly into the German 1st Army.
The commander of this army, General Alexander von Kluck, wanted to swing around the British opposition his forces encountered. But the German 2nd Army commander, General Otto von Bülow, insisted that Kluck stay on his flank so that his army and the German 3rd Army (on Bülow’s left flank) could deal with the French opposite of them. After further protests and receiving no support from Moltke, Kluck conceded and followed orders (he was technically subordinated to Bülow).
If Kluck had outflanked the BEF, the results could have been disastrous for the British and the French. It was a missed opportunity that could have potentially sealed a German victory. However, the Germans and the French were organizationally still learning how to manage warfare of this scale and scope. When multiple armies operate together, and you put one of those army commanders in charge of the others, that commander will inevitably default to his own objectives and what’s best for his army. While it could have been an interesting turning point, it would have never happened, given how the German army was structured at this time.
The Build-up to the Apex
Schliefflen had predicted that a great climatic battle would occur fourteen days after the opening of hostilities. It would actually happen just over thirty days later, culminating in the First Battle of the Marne. Known to the French as the ‘Miracle on the Marne,’ it would result in a German defeat and lead to the Race to the Sea, the First Battle of Ypres, and four years of bloody trench warfare.
In Part 2, I’ll explore how things could have gone differently for the Germans and what this would have meant for the outcome of the war and other subsequent events.
Sources:
Meyer, G.J. A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918. New York, Bantam Books, 2015.
Comments