Disaster of the Marne
In the last blog, I attempted to highlight the key components of the original Schlieffen Plan, what influenced its construction, how those things changed over the years leading up to 1914, and what changes Moltke made. While these changes remain controversial (which is the reason for our discussion), the German army was seemingly undeterred. While they were delayed by the fort network at Leige by four to five days and missed an opportunity to destroy the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and route the French left flank, they were on the march toward Paris.
As I alluded to in Part 1, Schlieffen had predicted a climatic conclusion to his plan, with a battle that he estimated would take place fifteen days after the beginning of hostilities. In reality, the great climatic battle, and the primary topic of this blog, would happen closer to thirty days after Germany entered the war. The Marne Campaign, also known as the First Battle of the Marne, started on 5 September and would last until 12 September. When it began, the German Army was only 30 miles from Paris and had won a great victory against the Russians at Tannenberg. Everything seemed ripe for a German victory. But events would ensue that would seal their defeat and lead to four bloody years of trench warfare.
Picking it up with the German Right Wing
Surprised by the rapid deployment of the BEF, the ensuing German attacks would result in “The Great Retreat.” The German right wing was advancing, yet the long march toward Paris and the fighting they faced took its toll. The German soldiers of Kluck’s army were described by his staff:
“Our soldiers are worn out. For four days, they have been marching forty kilometers a day. The ground is difficult, the roads are torn up, trees felled, and the fields pitted by shells like strainers. The soldiers stagger at every step; their faces are plastered with dust, and their uniforms are in rags; one might call them living rag-bags. They march with closed eyes and sing in chorus to keep from falling asleep as they march. The certainty of victory close at hand and of their triumphal entry into Paris sustains them and whips up their enthusiasm. Without this certainty of victory, they would fall exhausted.”
But Moltke, it would seem, continued to place less of an emphasis on his right wing. After moving reinforcements to his left needlessly, he continued to look toward that flank, which approached the infamous Verdun. It’s unclear why, and that could be its own discussion, but he makes a critical decision in addition to the previous adjustments. He told Kluck and Bülow to halt their advance. He wanted them to stand in place and face west against whatever forces the French were mustering near Paris (little did the Germans know a whole new French army was being hastily formed).
Meanwhile, the Third Army would fight south to the River Seine while the Fourth and Fifth would advance west of Verdun. The Sixth and Seventh would cross the Moselle River with the end goal of these last pair of armies to break through, link up, and encircle the French around Verdun. At this point, the Schlieffen Plan is essentially, as the Germans say, “kaput.” Moltke had abandoned its core premise of capturing Paris, instead opting for a victory that would come around Verdun instead (ironic given the Germans would face similar fortifications around Verdun that precipitated the idea of bypassing the French frontier fortifications).
At the same time, the French commander, Joseph Joffre, was leaning into patience as his forces withdrew to regroup. Moreover, he was actively moving forces from his right to his left to face the German right, which was now weakened. Soon, the Germans would be outnumbered there, and the French would gain an advantage in a superior mass.
Despite this, it seemed, at least to Kluck, that victory was near. He ignored Moltke’s orders to stop, continuing to head south in search of the French army’s flank or to wipe out what remained of the BEF. He did not know another army was being formed in Paris that could take him in the flank, though he was no fool. He made preparations to potentially block any flanking maneuver as a precaution.
In another twist of fate, the French had intercepted a German radio message. Unfortunately, some of it was not in code. These papers were found on a German officer who seemingly took a wrong turn and had been killed by a French patrol. They showed where Kluck’s army was and where it was headed, yet cooperation was not forthcoming between the French Army and the British to aid the French 6th Army, which could've used this information with support to punish Kluck. But, a showdown was inevitable.
Stumbling into the Gap
On 5 September, the First Battle of the Marne kicked off, coinciding with Great Britain, Russia, and France entering into the Treaty of London that made the Triple Entente official. This meant no one would enter into a separate peace agreement with Germany, which would become important for the sake of our “what-if” conversation later—but first, the battle.
Kluck was already feeling his way to the southeast, with his subordinate, Gronau, holding his flank to defend against any attack from the west (Paris). When the half-formed French Sixth Army attacked the German defenses on the Ourcq River, Kluck, as he did when he encountered the scouting elements of the BEF, did not think it was a significant attack. However, he detached a corps to reinforce Gronau and then requested back the two corps he had given to Bülow on his left (which would become fateful).
Bülow did not know that the BEF had turned around and headed toward him. If he had, he probably would not have let those forces go, further depleting his already weakened right wing. But he complied. By the night of 5 September, Kluck had realized the attack against Gronau was a real threat, so he turned his army around, marching back across the Marne. This opened a thirty-five-mile gap between him and Bülow.
The BEF moved into this gap by happenstance (again, the Gods of War at work). Kluck and Bülow reacted differently when they realized the BEF was now between their two armies. Kluck wanted to stay on the attack with the French Sixth Army and moved troops over to face a potential British attack. On the other hand, Bülow planned a withdrawal for his army and Kluck’s, moving ten miles to establish their lines north of the British.
The initial French attacks were disastrous as Kluck’s army battled the French on the Ourcq River. Running into German defenses and supporting artillery, the raw recruits of the French 6th Army were no match for Kluck’s veteran force (albeit they were exhausted and at the extremity of their supply lines). Yet, the French commander Gallieni threw reinforcements into Paris taxicabs to bolster his front. The French 6th Army would eventually break before the Germans despite these efforts. Unfortunately, news reached Kluck that Bülow was withdrawing, leaving him no choice but to follow suit. When he made this decision, one of his corps was tearing apart the last French resistance, leaving thirty miles of open, undefended ground to Paris—but the order was to withdraw.
What if Paris had Fallen?
The events in the early days of World War I were complex and constantly changing. As I highlighted, both sides, especially the Germans, missed many opportunities to achieve an early victory. If Kluck had shattered the BEF before the Marne, it would have left the French in a difficult position on their left. Assuming the Germans could have followed it up by breaking the French in the west or near Verdun (or both), a French collapse could have happened before the Treaty of London was signed on 5 September.
That could’ve potentially resulted in the following:
With their veteran force wiped out, the British pursues peace separately from the French, abandoning Belgium to the Germans (the tripwire that forced them to enter the war) and Luxembourg.
With the British out, the French would’ve probably sued for peace as well, especially if Paris had fallen and their armies in the west were in bad shape. Perhaps they would’ve held out longer, but the Russians were not faring much better in the east. Coming to the table would’ve meant giving up territory to the Germans on the border, dismantling the border fortifications on the frontier, or perhaps giving them to the Germans, and possibly giving away colonial territories as well.
If the British and French had collapsed after the signing of the Treaty of London, then peace negotiations would have required all nations to come to the table together (which would have complicated things). Regardless, the terms would have favored the Germans, growing their power on the continent. This would’ve embittered the Entente, especially the British, who feared what German dominance meant for its global empire. Although there would've been no trench warfare, it would’ve most likely meant:
A future showdown between the German and British Empires.
France may have politically become fascist (to regain their honor after losing to Germany) or potentially socialist (as a result of a socialist or communist anti-war and imperial movement), or the Republic might have endured.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire would still not survive in its current state, given that a victory wouldn't solve any of its problems. How it breaks apart and what it means for the power struggle in Europe is a longer discussion.
The Ottoman Empire would not have fought in the war, but when it joined in October 1914, it did so out of desperation. It was an empire in decline; even without the war, the decline would’ve continued. Much like the Austro-Hungarian empire, their collapse would’ve greatly interested the major powers in Europe for various reasons. Again, this is a longer discussion.
Russia falling into revolution (if they even still do in the same way) could’ve turned into a proxy war between the German Empire (supporting the Reds) and the British (supporting the Whites). Yet, would the German Empire send Lenin back to Russia like they did in our timeline? Would they support the Reds if there was no war they were trying to use them to bring about peace?
What-ifs are Fun…but Learn the Actual History
I would like to close this blog series with a nudge for my readers to go and learn about the actual history. What-if history is a fun exercise, but I hope that through this series, people become inspired to learn more about the actual events that took place (I really only scratched the surface with this early phase of the war). I’ve recommended this book before, but A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918 by G.J. Meyer is a great starting point for this topic. I leaned heavily on Meyer’s research to develop this two-part series.
If you haven’t already, please join my newsletter to receive monthly recommendations on books (and sometimes other types of media) related to military history, future books in my alternate history series timeline, The Kaiser’s Machines (out on Amazon now), and stay up-to-date with this blog.
Sources:
Meyer, G.J. A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918. New York, Bantam Books, 2015.
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